For a coup to be successful, enough people with power (which means guns) need to believe and support it. This requires a leader with charisma and loyalty that can inspire such belief in the military rank and file, as well as the willingness of those with the most powerful weapons to fight for the cause. And if the current leader is corrupt or has done something wrong, even more support can be needed.
These conditions have not escaped the attention of the international community, which has been concerned about the recent spread of political instability characterized by military-backed regimes. But the focus on these phenomena can obscure other important dynamics underlying them. One is the resurgence of self-coups, where incumbent executives use the military to seize more power for themselves rather than overthrowing a government. Whether it be Egypt’s ousted president Morsi, Peru’s Alberto Fujimori or Tunisia’s Kais Saied, these autogolpes often involve military participation in shutting down parliaments, repressing protests or prosecuting opponents in military courts.
Drawing on an original dataset of security forces in 110 countries and careful process tracing in individual cases, this book argues that military self-coups are a consequence of the way rulers structure their coercive institutions. It shows that the presence of other coercive institutions outside the military chain of command can deter a coup attempt. By signaling to militaries that facilitating a coup is unprofessional, and by providing them with guidance on how to react when they receive quasi-legal orders to violate democracy, these other institutions can create incentives for military leaders to resist the lure of a power grab.
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