Global sanctions are a powerful instrument of coercion that has long been used to encourage or discourage certain types of policy outcomes. Yet understanding their efficacy and costs has been difficult because of the lack of a comprehensive dataset that can capture all aspects of their use, including the target’s ability to circumvent sanctions. The Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB) addresses this gap, opening the black box of sanction costs, and improving our understanding of when economic coercion succeeds.
Historically, regimes with strong ruling ideologies have portrayed external pressure as an assault on the nation and urged citizens to rally around the flag, encouraging them to support the government and defy foreign sanctions. In some cases – such as in Weimar Germany or early Fascist Italy – this strategy has worked, but other times, it fails to bring about change. Nevertheless, as the author argues, sanctions are still an important tool in many countries and have a role to play in the future.
It is vital to make sure that the benefits of sanctions outweigh their costs. This means that sanctioners need to forge the largest possible coalitions, ensure that the demands associated with sanctions are attainable and that local companies are prevented from circumventing sanctions. In addition, they need to be more transparent about their intentions and develop exit scenarios in case they change course. The author argues that these changes can help make the most of the potential of sanctions as a coercive instrument in the future and that they should be accompanied by incentives, which have shown to be effective in some cases.
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